“Staying away from Europe by Playing Its Rules of

Conduct” [könyvismertetés] by Peterecz, Zoltán
139
BOOK REVIEWS
______________________________________________________ EJAS
“Staying away from Europe by Playing Its Rules of 
Conduct” 
Eliga H. Gould: Among the Powers of the Earth: The American 
Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2012. pp. 344. ISBN: 9780674046085 
Zoltán Peterecz
It is well known and understood that the once British colonists in 
becoming Americans and creating a new country had to struggle through 
various phases in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. One such 
phase was the War of Independence itself, in which the scattered new 
states had to prove they were military equal of the mighty British Empire. 
Another question was the domestic situation that for long remained 
chaotic once independence was achieved, and by being in such a fluid 
state, it endangered the whole independent status of the Union for a while. 
The third factor was the diplomatic arena in which the young United 
States had to make a stand and maneuver among more and less hostile 
European powers in order to be recognized not as an accident in history 
but a new chapter that came to stay. 
Eliga Gould’ new book, Among the Powers of the Earth, picks up 
this latter stream from a somewhat uncommon point of view. He does not 
deal with the intriguing and very important foreign diplomatic issues in 
detail, although these stay throughout in the background. Rather, he 
investigates how the United States rode an overall scheme in its 
relationship to European powers. That was, according to the author, the 
recognition of the importance of the treaties concluded between equal 
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partners and their trust that the other side would faithfully carry out the 
stipulations laid down in those treaties. As a newcomer, and often seen in 
terms of rebellious and not worthy of taking its place in the family of 
nations, let alone powers, the United States had to find the way to be seen 
as a country that deserved to sign a treaty with. On the other hand, as the 
book convincingly shows, the American administrations used this outer 
veneer of diplomatic recognition to make maximum use of freedom in 
dealing with others closer to home, such as Indians, African Americans, 
and other European subjects in America.
The author maintains throughout the book, which covers the period 
between the French and Indian War (1756–1763) and the declaration of 
the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, in a convincing fashion how much the 
United States was dependent on the European question of war and peace. 
In Gould’s thesis, the more the United States wanted to pry itself free of 
European entanglements, the more it took a very similar internationalist 
legal point of view. He emphasizes that for the new-born United States 
one of the most important things was to become an accepted partner, first 
and foremost, to the European powers. In order to do that, the United 
States had to become a treaty-worthy nation, the most often recurring 
term of the book, which, in the author’s view, was just as equally 
important as the liberal and republican ideologies that have so 
prominently appeared in the post-World War II historiography. It is 
important that the struggle to attain this prominent level in the 
international arena, and, therefore, the future of the United States, was to 
a large degree dependent upon how the European powers related to it, or 
as Gould puts it, “the history they made was often the history that others 
were willing to let them make” (2). 
In the wake of the defining peace treaties of Westphalia (1648) and 
Utrecht (1713), a law of nations slowly became the norm in Europe, 
which was not the reality, however, outside the European continent, for 
example, in America. There, Spanish or French privateers and Indians did 
not heed to the accustomed law of nations of Europe, and the plurality of 
the colonies did not help this matter either. The French and Indian War in 
the middle of the eighteenth century was a war between European powers 
reacting to trouble outside Europe. As a result of Britain’s effort to extend 
the law of nations to America, the British became better “friends” of the 
Natives then the colonists. Still the origins of the Revolution, according to 
the author, did not lie simply in resentment to taxes by Britain “but in the 
bonds that tied them as never before to Europe’s diplomatic republic” (42).
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Britain tried to clamp down on any effort that seemed to endanger 
the peace on the high seas, as they saw it, so they doubled their effort 
during and after the French and Indian War to strike down on any type of 
smuggling. This, however, in the end was a major source of contention in 
the American colonies and, therefore, can be seen as another significant 
source of the Revolution. After the Seven Years’ War, Britain maintained 
a 10,000-troop contingent in America to uphold the treaty against any 
violations from either France or Spain. The triple threat to Britain’s effort 
to keep the treaty-bound peace on the North American continent came 
from other nations (France and Spain prominently), the Natives, and, 
mainly, the colonists. British colonists, who would become later 
Americans, took to a narrow interpretation of the British laws and peace 
efforts on the North American continent. Strangely, the would-be 
Americans wished to achieve as a nation the very same level, which they 
resented when their mother country earlier had tried to make them 
recognize it.
So, Gould states, “Americans recognized that independence was a 
condition that required the consent of other governments, not something 
that they could achieve unilaterally” (114). Two things especially 
complicated this issue. One such thing was that Americans were seen by 
many simply as rebels, or even criminals. The second was, largely 
stemming from the first, that “neither Britain nor Europe’s other powers 
accepted them as treaty-worthy equals” (119). This was particularly true 
in the relationship with London, which after the War of Independence 
refused to grant Americans full commercial privileges. Britain opposed 
the young United States on the seas and on land, where it did not empty 
stations and provided materiel to the Indians. Low-grade hostilities 
characterized the relationship with Spain as well, and France also created 
some problems. The chaotic situation under the Articles of Confederation 
did not help either: on the one hand, Europeans did not see a unified 
country1, on the other, the sovereign state made it difficult to carry out the 
provisions of the Treaty of Paris (1783), for example, such questions as 
the Loyalist compensation or claims of British creditors remained 
1 John Adams, on his proposal to enter into a commercial treaty with the former foe, 
Great Britain, was met with the cynical question, “Would you like one treaty or
thirteen, Mr. Adams?’’ quoted in Janda, Kenneth, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Jerry 
Goldman. The Challenge of Democracy. American Government in Global Politics. 
Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2012, 71.
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unresolved for years. Therefore, it further strengthened the view that the 
Americans were not treaty-worthy as a nation. That is why the 
Constitution of 1787 was so crucial. Not only did it create a strong central 
government and paved the way for a more unified country, but, as a 
consequence, with the ratification of the new Constitution, the United 
States managed to reach such a status that satisfied the European powers 
that it could be counted among their ranks.
The first real watershed from this vantage point was Jay’s Treaty in 
1794. It helped to avert the possibility of a future war against Great 
Britain, at least for the time being. Despite the almost unanimous clamor 
with which the treaty was greeted in the United States, because it was 
seen as subservient to British will, the treaty ensured that trade relations 
were further cultivated with the strongest empire in the world in the time 
of the French revolutionary wars. Also, the British at long last 
commenced the evacuation of various military posts on the territory of the 
United States. Perhaps more importantly, “the ceremonies” that 
accompanied the handing over of these garrisons, “confirmed that the 
United States now had a government worthy of Europe’s respect” (139).
Gould expands the picture to minorities as well, which is a welcome 
novelty to the era in question. One such outstanding issue was naturally 
slavery. Although on paper slave trade was illegal, slaveholding was not. 
The nation’s most important founding documents all embraced the 
legality of slavery, even if not by name, and the aforementioned Jay 
Treaty, an international treaty, only strengthened this feature. This 
duality, together with Britain’s sometimes trepid enforcement of the law 
on the high seas, and Americans doing everything in their power not to 
submit themselves to such law enforcement by Britain, slave trade, illegal 
on paper after 1807, and slavery remained lucrative and essential in the 
south of the United States. This was the duality that characterized 
America so much until the Civil War: no slave trade but slavery, slavery-
free states together with slave states, becoming party to the international 
treaty-bound community, but picking selectively the ones that referred to 
slavery. As a result, by the mid-1810s, “the United States enjoyed all the 
rights of a treaty-worthy nation, and those rights worked almost entirely 
to the advantage of the Union’s slaveholding citizens” (177).
The other large group that was affected by the appearance of the 
new country in North America was the Native Americans. The British 
maintained good and, from the United States’ point of view, detrimental 
relations with the Indian tribes. The First Seminole War in the Floridas 
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(1814–1819) then proved how much had changed in a few decades. The 
United States emerged as “not only a treaty-worthy nation in its own right 
but was increasingly able to impose its views on others” (179). The 
United States, after all, took this territory by the force of treaty, although 
the tangible force of Andrew Jackson played a crucial part in provoking 
those culminating treaties. Great Britain left the place for good, basically 
together with Spain, and both concluded treaties with the United States 
that established clear borders. The Indians, however, were deemed in 
Florida as extralegal, since they refused to acquiesce to the treaty made 
between the U.S. government and the Creek National Council. The 
Indians fell victim to the will of the United States, and the runaway slaves 
lost all hope to remain free in the Floridas. As Gould states, one of the 
main reasons for such events becoming possible was that “for the first 
time in the Union’s brief history, Europe was at peace, and, as a result, 
Americans were free to claim all the rights of a great treaty-worthy 
nation, including the right to make whatever peace they chose with their 
neighbors who lacked that status” (180).
The ensuing peaceful period had three major consequences for 
Gould. The American government had the right to decide over peoples’ 
faith within its sphere; it helped slavery to be maintained in the South; 
and it enabled “the United States to assume the role of a great nation in 
the lands and waters in its immediate vicinity” (215). However deeply 
entrenched the notion is that the United States sought absolute non-
entanglement with Europe, Gould calls attention to the fact that the 
United States “remained entangled in deep and profound ways with the 
history of Europe, including, especially, Britain, and the same was true of 
the nations and peoples in the Union’s immediate vicinity” (218).
Gould’s book merits praise on at least two accounts. One is that his 
approach is not a narrow one readers are usually accustomed to. Largely 
relying on primary sources, he does not take only the “American” point of 
view, but deliberately takes into consideration that of the British and the 
Spanish, the Indians, and the African Americans. By doing so, he arrives 
at a more holistic picture of the discussed period. The other is that all this 
is done with a fluidity that does not render the reading heavy. With the 
small stories that are nonetheless very relevant to the larger topics being 
discussed, he manages to render the sometimes more abstract topics very 
tangible. The reader can be sure that their knowledge will be largely 
expanded by this new book, and it is only a question of time before it 
becomes a standard textbook at colleges.
